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Abstract
This paper examines two major regulatory systems chemists and chemical manufacturers
must deal with on a day-to-day basis. There are dozens of different sets of regulations that
affect the chemical industry throughout the world. Many countries have their own specific
rules that govern the chemicals manufactured or imported inside their borders. Specifically,
this paper will examine the rise of the European Union’s REACH system, the failure and
reform of the United States’ TSCA and finally, the effects these two systems have upon each
other.
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Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers
When a person sets out to become a chemist, they could reasonably expect to become
well versed with concepts such as hydroxyl numbers, nucleophiles and free radicals over the
course of their chemistry careers. Designing, analyzing and evaluating chemical compounds
would be typical expectations of a chemist starting work at a manufacturing company once they
complete their education. And for the most part, that would be true. But a manufacturing
company may expect more from their new employees in areas not covered in a traditional
university curriculum. The new employee may be expected to become an expert on the many
chemical regulations that govern exactly where and how a chemical manufacturer can legally sell
their products.
According to R. Auerbach, who has been working with chemical regulations since 1976,
there are multiple different regulatory systems throughout the world. Several of these systems
have recently undergone major reform, such as: the European Union’s REACH, the United
States’ TSCA, Korea’s new K-REACH, Taiwan’s updated TCSCA, and several food contact
related regulations. China, Thailand and Turkey were also working to update and revise their
regulatory law, which were expected to generate updated requirements in the near future
(personal communication, September 11, 2019). Chemical regulatory laws have been and will be
an expanding area of emphasis for industrial manufacturing for the foreseeable future.
To understand these regulatory systems may require a person to have assumed a lawyer’s
mindset rather than a chemist’s. These regulations were mostly designed by the various countries
and regions to protect their citizens and preserve the natural environment from a wide variety of
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dangerous substances. This examination will cover just some of the complex labyrinth of
regulations governing chemical manufacturers and the reasons that have made them necessary.
The specific regulatory systems this paper will focus on are the European Union’s REACH, the
United States’ TSCA, the effects they have had on one another and their influence throughout the
world.
European Chemical Regulatory Systems
According to Mork and Hansson (2007), the European Union established the beginnings
of chemical regulation in 1967. A harmonized system for the classification and labeling of
chemicals was agreed upon by the member states and was enacted. During the 1970’s, European
countries had extended discussions over chemical unknowns and the need to find better
solutions. In 1981, European countries conducted a chemical inventory, and it was discovered
that the global chemical market consisted of an astounding 100,000 plus chemicals (Lewis,
Kazantzis, Fishtik & Wilcox, 2006).
This discovery spurred European countries to create their own individual regulatory
systems. It was agreed by the European Union member states when a chemical on the market
before September 1981, it was considered as pre-existing. The existing chemicals did not
necessarily have to be evaluated for health and environmental effects according to the agreement.
These pre-existing chemicals were placed on a chemical inventory list known as the European
Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances, or EINECS. The list was only open for
a one-time mass addition and then the inventory list was considered closed (Mork & Hansson,
2007).
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A separate, more rigorous regulatory listing was created for any chemical that entered the
market after the 1981 deadline. These chemicals were considered new for the purposes of
inventory listings. These new chemicals were “to be tested for their effects on human health and
the environment” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 561). Lewis et al. (2006) state that since the
introduction of these new regulations, only around 3,000 new chemicals had been fully brought
onto the market. The approximately 3,000 chemicals only represent “about 1% of the total
production volume” of all of Europe (Mork & Hansson, 2007, p. 23).
New chemicals suffered when compared to the EINECS listed chemicals due to the
uncertainty behind the testing and the ensuing risk assessment results. This uncertainty was “not
particularly conducive to innovation because of the different rules” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p.
7116). "Many believed that the lack of regulatory obstacles for the use of existing chemicals had
stifled innovation because it was expensive for the chemicals industry to perform research on
novel chemical alternatives” (Williams, Panko & Paustenbach, 2009, p. 555). Williams et al.
describe that these novel chemical alternatives would have fallen under the far stricter
regulations and were not worth the extra effort and cost to chemical companies. The regulatory
testing results on new chemicals has not produced “sufficient information or sound chemical risk
assessment practices pertaining to the environment. Furthermore, whenever the associated risks
of these substances have been identified, the implementation of risk management measures has
been unacceptably slow” (Lewis et al., 2006, p. 593).
European Regulatory Reform
During the 1990’s, an effort was launched by the European Council to evaluate the risks
associated with the high-volume chemicals on the EINECS list. Mork and Hansson (2007) stated
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that these risk assessments were to be handled by expert committees from the field of chemistry.
From 1993-2005, these committees performed risk assessments for 130 chemicals, 71 of which
were completed and 58 required their assessments to be modified to reduce the associated risks.
Or put another way, almost 45% of the high-volume chemicals tested from the grandfathered
EINECS list needed additional safety measures to be implemented.
Several things were becoming clear to the European governments that “chemical
producers know too little about the environmental and human safety of the substances they
produce” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7116). The regulatory systems in place were affecting
“patterns of research activity and innovation, causing the European chemical industry to lag
behind its main counterparts in the US and Japan” (Lewis et al., 2006, p. 593). With human,
environmental, and financial health on the line, the need for reliable chemical data was becoming
critical.
As stated by Mork and Hansson (2007), in February 2001, a report titled Strategy for a
Future Chemicals Policy was released. This report, commonly called the White Paper, outlined
the concepts and needs for a new European chemical policy. Mork and Hansson summarize the
White Paper’s goals as follows:
•

Protection of human health and the environment.

•

Maintenance and enhancement of the competitiveness of the EU chemical
industry.

•

Prevent fragmentation of the internal market.

•

Increased transparency.

•

Integration with international efforts.
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Promotion of non-animal testing.

•

Conformity with EU international obligations under the WTO (2007, pp. 23-24).
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Another major finding of the White Paper, according to Fisher (2014), was that the
society of the world must have chemicals. The everyday reliance on chemically-manufactured
products was complete and total. Along with these findings, the White Paper lamented that there
were entirely too many unknown chemicals present that were affecting the environment and
human health. “The primary focus of the White Paper was thus upon the generation of
information” (Fisher, 2014, p. 167).
REACH
When legislation was brought up for debate, “the European Parliament identified
REACH as the single most important dossier ever to be discussed within its walls” (Heyvaert,
2009, p. 113). The original bill was toned down and concessions were made. “Industrial lobbying
did achieve the alleviation of some of the initially planned regulatory requirements” (Heyvaert,
2009, p. 114). But the lobbying effort did not stop the vast majority of the legislation. So, despite
international and industrial complaints and concerns, “the REACH Regulation (Regulation (EC)
No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/4, 2006), entered into
force in 2007” (Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 303).
Lahl and Hawxwell (2006) stated that this revolutionized system consolidated more than
forty individual sets of regulatory laws into one legislation. This helped to limit confusion and
increase the European Union’s ability to focus on enforcing one single system of laws. The old

CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT

8

EINECS system of new and existing chemicals was no more. All chemicals were now
considered as new under REACH.
According to Williams et al. (2009), the main goals of REACH were:
1. Compile a suite of physicochemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological data for
each substance.
2. Establish safe usage parameters by conducting chemical safety assessments
(CSAs).
3. Allow for regulatory evaluation of substances to determine potential hazards
based on the compiled data.
4. Prevent the use of substances of very high concern (SVHCs) without the approval
of the European Chemicals Agency.
5. Restrict the use of chemicals for which no safe usage parameters can be
established (p. 555).
When REACH legislation was passed, it was around 700 pages long (Lahl & Hawxwell,
2006). As a regulatory system, REACH was “one of the most difficult to understand, and that
difficulty is not primarily due to its length” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7116). Van Hemmen
(2009) noted that REACH guidance documents were plentiful and numbered over 6,000 pages at
the time. However, the legislation’s length was minuscule when compared to the supporting
paperwork that has been generated by each registrant.
Tonnage Bands
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Forbes (2009) stated “any manufacturer or importer of a substance, either on its own or in
one or more preparation(s), in quantities of one tonne or more per year, shall submit a
registration to the Agency” (p. 35). Forbes continues to describe that different phase-in deadlines
were put in place to for these registrations. Imports and manufacturing weights of 100 tonnes or
more of a chemical that had previously been listed on the EINECS list had to be registered by
May 31, 2013. This was required for each company that intended to manufacture or import the
chemical into the European Union. If a chemical fell between one and 100 tonnes, the deadline
for registration was delayed until May 31, 2018. The largest quantities of 1,000 tonnes or more
had the much shorter registration deadline date set at November 30, 2010.
Exemptions
Of course, there were exemptions to the required REACH registration. Substances
manufactured or imported in amounts less than one tonne (1,000 kgs) per year did not have to be
registered (Williams et al., 2009). “Substances used in medications for humans or animals, or in
foodstuffs or feeds” were exempted primarily because they are regulated by other European
Union laws (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7117). And “polymers are exempted as well from the
requirement to register since they usually are not very hazardous” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 562).
Van Hemmen also listed some additional exempted substances, which are commonly found in
the environment. Some of these examples are oxygen, cellulose pulp, water, minerals and noble
gases.
Williams et al. (2009) note the chemical ingredients, also known as monomers, which are
reacted to create polymers must be registered. One exemption to this would be if a monomer
made up less than two percent of a product’s composition and the monomer’s total weight in that
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product was imported in less than one metric tonne per year. Then product containing the
monomer could be shipped into REACH regulated countries and the monomer would be exempt
from registration filing as related by R. Auerbach (personal communication, September 11,
2019).
R. Auerbach noted that some non-European Union companies were willing to extend
their company’s REACH registration coverage to customers for certain chemicals. The
customers in this case would purchase a registered raw material from the supplier, use the raw
material in their manufacture and then would import the finished product into the European
Union under the raw material supplier’s registration tonnage. Another work around for firsthand
registering a chemical would have been when a chemical was purchased from European supplier,
then used in manufacturing, and finally imported back into Europe. This process was known as
re-import and was REACH covered by the European company’s registration (personal
communication, September 11, 2019). The benefit of Europe’s re-import business was an
example of how REACH was used to help promote European businesses.
Chemical Dossier
“REACH regulation requires registrants to submit a registration dossier, which is
composed of a technical dossier summarizing the results of a chemical safety assessment”
(Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 303). Some of the data required in these dossiers, apart from
standard registrant and chemical information, included toxicological studies, thermochemical
and (thermo)physical properties, as well as risk assessment study results (Lewis et al.,
2006). The lack of toxicological data in particular, was one of the primary reasons for REACH
to have sprung into existence in the first place (Karamertzanis et al., 2019). Karamertzanis et al.
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go on to state that “approximately 40% of the registrations under REACH have been updated at
least once after the first submission” (2019, p. 304). This has shown evidence of the European
Chemicals Agency’s dedication to ensuring that the most current and complete chemical data
was being used for assessing risk for both human and environmental health.
A Chemical Safety Report was also a requirement of the registration dossier for
chemicals 10 tonnes and over per year (Williams et al, 2009). The Chemical Safety Report
“documents the hazards and classifications of a substance and the assessment as to whether the
substance is carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic, persistent and bioaccumulating toxic, or very
persistent and very bioaccumulating” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 562). The Chemical Safety Report
evaluates how a substance was used by downstream users and outlined risk management steps
that would have limited the risk that compromised their health and the environment (Williams et
al, 2009).
Van Hemmen (2009) stated that not only did the Chemical Safety Report address
downstream users, but the report also considered risk management steps as to how to reduce risk
during manufacturing. This assessment was accomplished through an exposure scenario review.
This review was another requirement of the Chemical Safety Report.
Van Hemmen (2009) outlined an exposure scenario’s format as follows:
1 - Short title of the exposure scenario
2 - Processes and activities covered
3 - Duration and frequency of use
4.1 - Physical form of substance or preparation; surface to volume ratio of articles
4.2 - Concentration of substance in preparation or article
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4.3 - Amount used per time or activity
5 - Other relevant operation conditions of use
6.1 - Risk management measures related to human health (specified for workers or
consumers)
6.2 - Risk management measures related to the environment
7 - Waste management measures
8 - Exposure prediction and reference to its source
9 - Guidance to downstream user to evaluate whether work inside the boundaries set by
the exposure scenario (p. 563).
Cost on Industry
The cost of REACH registration placed on the chemical industry was extremely high.
“Various impact assessment studies undertaken on behalf of the European Commission provide
estimates for the associated costs induced by REACH within the range of 3-5 billion Euros”
(Lewis et al., 2006, p. 592). A registration dossier that was submitted incurred a cost of over
€24,000 each (Benko, 2013). Lewis et al. go on to state that there were provisions put into place
to help reduce compliance costs for smaller manufacturers. These were designed to limit the
impact REACH would have on their finite resources. If one considered every active chemical
company doing business in Europe, and then multiplied that number by every chemical they use
to manufacture goods, one could see how the registration fees would have mounted quickly. The
registration cost did not even include the cost of the studies required to meet registration.
Some companies were forced to make difficult decisions about which products they
would be willing to pay to register because of REACH. T. Pledger related “REACH has had a
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significant commercial cost and poses a technical barrier in many cases. It limits the amount of
product we can import, dependent on which tonnage band the product has been registered for.
Though financial investment has not been the only cost incurred. The effort in manpower
resources to get the product imported has also been significant” (personal communication,
August 8, 2019). R. Auerbach described one product his company chose to not register because
it would have cost over $75,000 in registration fees and testing. The cost of registration was not
worth gambling on potential future sales in this case (personal communication, September 11,
2019). According to T. Pledger, some commercially available products that had been previously
sold in Europe were sold in such small volumes that they did not justify the cost of continuing
the business (personal communication, August 8, 2019).
Chemical Registration
Before December 1, 2008, a pre-registration or phase-in period was opened, which
grouped companies that were registering the same substance (Van Hemmen, 2009). As an
incentive for the chemical industry’s compliance, the registration fees were waived during this
pre-registration phase (Williams et al., 2009). The effect was a success. The European Chemicals
Agency “announced in early 2009 that over 2.2 million pre-registrations had been filed before
the deadline, encompassing over 100,000 chemicals and 66,000 companies” (Williams et al,
2009, p. 557).
In order to participate in pre-registration, manufacturers or importers must have been
previously active in the European Union’s chemical market (Forbes, 2009). Van Hemmen (2009)
stated that the European Chemicals Agency grouped the pre-registering companies that were
desiring to register the same substances into groups which were known as Substance Information
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Exchange Forums (SIEF). These SIEFs were an information exchange conduit that helped to
limited vertebrate animal testing by eliminating multiple duplicate experiments that studied the
same chemicals.
The SIEFs were required to choose a Lead Registrant from each grouping. The Lead
Registrant was ultimately in charge of preparing the final dossier for the group to the European
Chemicals Agency. Each SIEF member was required to provide any existing findings, share the
cost of the registration and testing, assist with data and gap analysis, and help generate additional
data as needed (Forbes, 2009).
Working with and sharing this much information with companies using the same
materials could have led to competitors attempting to take advantage of another company’s data.
As an additional protection, REACH allowed companies to use a Third-Party Representative to
mask their identity from other members of the SIEF. The registering company would still be
responsible for their registration duties and fees but would submit the same dossier paperwork as
the rest of the SIEF (Forbes, 2009).
Once all the data was collected by the SIEFs, the Lead Registrant prepared the dossier
submission (Forbes, 2009). Forbes continued to state that the group members reviewed,
discussed, revised and finally submitted the dossier to the European Chemicals Agency. When
submitting the registration packet, the registrant would send the information through a secure
portal called REACH-IT (Karamertzanis et al., 2019). Karamertzanis et al. describe this system
as a “central IT system that supports industry, Member State Competent Authorities and the
European Chemicals Agency to securely submit, process and manage data and dossiers” (2019,
p. 304).
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The Agency then reviewed the submission for the required content and examined the data
for quality of testing. Any substance that proved to be of concern would be passed along to the
European Union member states for review. The member states would then have used this
information for legislation on hazard classification revisions of the substance in question. If no
outstanding issues were present, the European Chemicals Agency approved the dossiers within a
certain time frame and the registrant would appear on a listing of substances. This list was
available to the public for easier evaluation of the known hazards of a product. Some information
would be confidential and withheld from the public listing, such as composition details and
supplier/downstream user relationships (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006).
As the SIEF groupings showed, emphasis was placed on the manufacturers and importers
under this system. They were responsible for the registration of each substance and testing the
dangers of the chemicals they supply to their downstream users (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006).
Registration must have been completed before companies could conduct any marketing in the
European Union, this was also known as “no data, no market” (Filipec, 2014, p. 169). When the
potential sales of an entire continent were threatened to be cut off, manufacturers were forced
into compliance no matter how strongly they objected to the reforms.
Only Representatives
One important business aspect of REACH was that it was focused on positioning
European chemical manufacturers for future competitive success (Lewis et al, 2006). Forbes
(2009) stated that the European Union manufacturers and importers under REACH were able to
become direct registrants themselves. This lessened any trade issues within the European Union
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member states. Forbes elaborated that any manufacturers outside of the European Union would
not have the same privilege.
In order to import into European Union, manufacturers were required to name an Only
Representative. The Only Representative was a company within the European Union that would
handle the import duties on their behalf (Forbes, 2009). Essentially, the need for an Only
Representative created an entirely new industry in Europe. According to R. Auerbach, REACH
was the genesis of the Only Representative business, several existing European companies were
able to upgrade and expand their consulting and testing services to move into this line of
business because of the legislation (personal communication, October 14, 2019).
The Only Representative would have to agree to a non-disclosure agreement and sign a
contract to represent a non-European Union company. The hiring company would then provide
their product formulas to the Only Representative. These highly confidential formulas would
have contained the composition and exact percentages of each monomer of every product
imported to be sold. The Only Representative would then set up a database and track the import
quantities of the product. The Only Representative would have to break down the import
quantities to the monomer levels that are shipped into the European Union (R. Auerbach,
personal communication, September 11, 2019).
The Only Representative would monitor and report the annual import levels of products
and monomers levels. These levels would be compared versus the REACH registration tonnage
levels for which the non-European Union company they represented had been approved. The
Only Representative would also have compared their import data against the export records
provided by the hiring company. Additionally, the Only Representative would have compared
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the product purchases reported by downstream users, such as customers and distributors, to the
registered tonnage levels for which their client had been registered (R. Auerbach, personal
communication, September 11, 2019). If a company exceeded their import tonnage registration,
the European Chemicals Agency could have issued fines to the importer or even up to restricting
a company from conducting business in the European Union ever again (R. Auerbach, personal
communication, October 14, 2019).
Safer Chemicals
Through registration, REACH gathered massive amounts of new data on chemicals and
grew their database. The European Chemicals Agency and its partner countries began “working
more and more on groups of substances rather than individual ones” (European Chemicals
Agency, 2018, p. 9). “Such information makes a significant contribution towards the safe use of
chemicals given the high number of substances that are classified because of the presence of
known hazardous constituents or impurities” (Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 314). They
discovered additional information on the unknowns that only served to enhance their knowledge
on how to classify dangerous chemicals.
“REACH has dual aims: a high level of protection, and the enhancing of competitiveness
and innovation” (Fischer, 2014, p. 167). One such way that REACH performed these goals was
to promote the replacement of hazardous chemicals with safer alternatives. “Substitution
contributes to the overarching EU objectives for a non-toxic environment and a circular
economy, wherein innovation and sustainable production and consumption are key elements”
(European Chemicals Agency, 2018, p. 4).
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To help facilitate this substitution initiative, the European Chemicals Agency (2018) listed the
following for its 2019-2023 Strategic Pan:
•

Promoting best practice examples of increased substitution of hazardous
substances, green chemistry, and sustainability in the supply chain;

•

Promoting a mindset and behavioral change within industry towards sustainable
and safer chemicals;

•

Collaborating with industry associations in raising awareness in developing and
providing tools for sustainability assessments of chemical supplies (p. 5).

The European Chemicals Agency planned to hold numerous supply chain workshops
with assistance from the member states of the European Union. At these workshops, the goal was
to increase communication for more targeted substitutions on chemicals of concern or of very
high concern. This helped suppliers focus on what research services they could provide for the
purchasers and clarified what the purchasers were looking for from the suppliers. These
workshops were also a valuable tool for gauging what the most pressing concerns were for
research that may require additional government funding (European Chemicals Agency,
2018). These supply chain workshops were very European Union focused. This helped to pursue
the goal of promoting the future success of the European chemical industry as world leaders in
safe chemical substitution innovation.
“Sustainable substitution requires a proper understanding of the hazards and risks
associated with the substances to be substituted and, when a chemical is substituted by another,
of the hazards and risks of the alternatives” (European Chemicals Agency, 2018, p. 9). “REACH
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may/will lead to many substitutions of chemicals, either forced or on a voluntary basis. In the
end we may expect a less hazardous exposure to chemicals” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 568).
Trade Influence
“REACH not only represents a comprehensive regulatory policy framework for the
management of chemicals in the European Union but is also compatible with World Trade
Organization rules and directives” (Lewis et al., 2006 p. 592). Not all World Trade Organization
countries fully agreed with the assessment of full compatibility, however the European Union
had been dismissive of these concerns (Heyvaert, 2009). These opposing countries have pointed
out the “unnecessary barrier to international trade” that REACH generated, particularly the ‘no
data, no market’ rules (Forbes, 2009, p. 49).
However, the World Trade Organization agreements have allowed for members to adopt
rules for “protecting human, animal, or plant life and health, and the environment” that they have
felt were necessary (Forbes, 2009, p. 49). Forbes also stated that “REACH falls within at least
one of these provisions and, importantly, it is possible that it cannot be challenged” through the
World Trade Organization because of the emphasis REACH placed on human and environmental
health (2009, p. 49).
BREXIT
One benefit of consolidating the multiple regulations that were in place before REACH
was the ability to have one consistent set of rules for the entire European Union. REACH had
intended to stop the “fragmentation of the internal market” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p.
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562). However, the internal market has been on the verge of fragmenting with the oncoming of
United Kingdom’s Brexit push.
In 1973, the United Kingdom joined the European Union (formerly known as the
European Economic Community) and had been a willing partner for over 40 years. But the
United Kingdom decided to leave after a referendum was held June 23, 2016. The votes were
tallied with the results of 52-48 percent in favor of leaving. The United Kingdom will become
the first member ever to do so. (“Brexit: All you need…”, 2019). How both parties have handled
this breakup has been uncharted territory and the outcome was still unclear as of October 2019.
Several Brexit deals have been agreed upon by negotiators and leaders from both sides,
only to be voted down by Parliament. These failed negotiations have led to the resignation of two
Prime Ministers thus far. So, how would this affect chemical regulation? If no deal can be agreed
upon, the plan would be to adapt the entire REACH regulation as UK REACH per the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. There would be minor changes made to adopt the wording
specific for the United Kingdom, but otherwise the whole legislation will be put in place as was
on the date of withdraw (Health and Safety Executive, n.d.).
If no deal was reached, then the UK REACH and REACH “regulatory agencies would
operate independently from each other” (Health and Safety Executive, n.d., para. 2). The Health
and Safety Executive went on to state that this would mean that the United Kingdom and
European Union each would be separate entities but require the same rules. All manufacturing
and importers worldwide would be required to submit all the same registration once again to UK
REACH.
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If manufacturers and importers did not comply, then those companies would be cut out of
conducting business in the United Kingdom the same manner in which they would have been in
the European Union with the “fundamental principle of ‘no data, no market’” (Health and Safety
Executive, n.d., para. 1). “Without a Withdrawal Agreement, the UK simply exits the EU two
years after notice is given - this is now known as ‘no-deal’” (Smith, 2018, p. 36). Smith
continued to state that without a deal, the United Kingdom would lose access to the over 750
trade agreements the European Union already had in place. The governments of the United
Kingdom and European Union were hoping for a deal as a best-case scenario. The reality would
be that companies should have been planning contingencies for a no-deal scenario.
However, Parliament has attempted to ease the transition as much as they could for
United Kingdom companies in a no-deal scenario. “While qualifying registrations held by UK
companies will be automatically transferred to the new system, the registrants will still be
required to resubmit data” (No-deal Brexit REACH…, 2019, p. 15). “A survey of 38 UK
companies by the Chemical Business Association (CBA) has found that 75 percent of them don’t
own the data that would be required for them to register chemicals under UK REACH” (No-deal
Brexit REACH…, 2019, p. 15). Many companies, domestic and abroad, have relied on data
sharing throughout REACH registration via SIEFs or other negotiated agreements (Broadwith,
2019). Broadwith also stated that data sharing between companies may not be as cooperative this
time when all the registration paperwork must be re-registered. Companies that owned the
REACH data may see a financial incentive to charge other companies for data.
Another issue that had emerged for companies in the European Union, United Kingdom
and the world in a no-deal scenario would be concerning Only Representatives. The 27 countries
in the European Union constituted the United Kingdom’s “largest trading partner, representing
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around 44.5% of UK trade goods and services in 2017” (Smith, 2018, p. 34). United Kingdom
companies may be forced to hire an Only Representative to represent them in the European
Union, and vice versa for European Union companies to be able to continue the large amount (of
now international) trade with each other (Broadwith, 2019). Countries on the outside of the
current European Union, would have to find a new Only Representative to represent their import
business in either the United Kingdom or European Union, dependent on which area their current
Only Representative resided.
The entire manufacturing industry should be very concerned with the uncertainty that
Brexit has brought to international trade. According to Smith (2018), one large company had
estimated that Brexit may cost them between €40 to 60 million a year in extra costs. Some
companies were just not sure what to plan for. “Large companies have already been planning for
Brexit and have assembled teams to deal with it, but surveys show that only one in seven small
to medium enterprises in their supply chain have started planning” (Smith, 2018, p. 39). This
would result in a huge effect on the large companies if they could not be assured of receiving raw
materials from portions their supply chains.
A Managing Director that spoke on behalf of BASF, a large enterprise, expressed
concern because of the sheer amount of chemical substances they had to register during REACH
registration. BASF was unsure of the cost of re-registration, and they were extremely concerned
when the unknown cost was multiplied by 1,000 registrations (No-deal Brexit REACH…,
2019). A European Business Development Manager for Estron Chemical, a small to medium
sized enterprise, expressed concern as well when it came to be time to register new products. For
each new product brought to market, the registration costs would be double what they have been
previously (T. Pledger, personal communication, August 8, 2019). “The call from industry is that
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the best outcome would be for the UK to remain within the jurisdiction of REACH, and
somehow associated with the European Chemicals Agency that oversees it” (Broadwith, 2019,
para. 7).
The uncertainty that surrounded the possible no-deal scenario could be alleviated with an
actual deal that was approved by both the European Union and the United Kingdom's Parliament.
A potential new deal was agreed upon between Boris Johnson, Prime Minister for the United
Kingdom, and Jean-Claude Juncker, European Union Commission President, on October 17,
2019. Johnson had threatened to leave the European Union on October 31, 2019 with or without
a deal. In response, Parliament had responded by passing a law that made a negotiated extension
request a requirement if no deal was in place by October 19, 2019 (Smith, 2019).
United States Chemical Regulatory Systems
Federal government regulations over certain types of chemicals have dated back to 1906.
This first regulation that concerned business transactions between states affected the
“misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks and drugs” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 2). According to
Krimsky, after 107 people were killed by a contaminated batch of Elixir Sulfanilamide, the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act was passed through Congress. This law ensured that drug
manufacturers were responsible for proving that their products were safe for use before they
could be sold to consumers.
Industrial chemical manufacturing had a major increase in production as World War II
was ending. The area of chemical commerce was still unregulated, as it did not fall under any of
the previous laws enacted in the United States. The federal government took a hands-off
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approach during this post-war boom and refrained from acting unless public health was at risk
(Krimsky, 2017). However, their time for inaction was rapidly drawing to a close.
As explained by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, “the American
conversation about protecting the environment began in the 1960s” (2018, para. 1). The book
Silent Spring was released, which addressed the overuse of pesticides. Then an oil rig off
California’s coast spilled millions of gallons of oil, which contaminated the water and beaches.
And finally, the Cuyahoga River running past Cleveland, Ohio once again caught on fire, fueled
by the water’s chemical contamination (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018).
Because of these reasons, in addition to more instances of industrial negligence, the
American public was growing restless for government intervention. President Richard Nixon
seized on the public support and led the way (United States Environmental Protection Agency,
2018). President Nixon formed the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, which
produced the 1971 report called Toxic Substances (Eichenberger, 2015). The committee’s report
on the risks toxic chemicals had found: “(1) toxic substances were entering the environment; (2)
the effects of these substances were largely unknown and potentially severe; (3) existing legal
mechanisms were not suited to address these effects; and (4) new legal authority was required”
(Eichenberger, 2015, pp. 125-126). The council’s recommendations on proposed legal authority
were drawn up, sent to Congress and recommend the creation of a new federal agency. (United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018).
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2018), these
recommendations included:
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The EPA would have the capacity to do research on important pollutants irrespective of
the media in which they appear, and on the impact of these pollutants on the total
environment.

•

Both by itself and together with other agencies, the EPA would monitor the condition of
the environment - biological as well as physical.

•

With this data, the EPA would be able to establish quantitative “environmental baselines”
- critical for efforts to measure adequately the success or failure of pollution abatement
efforts.

•

The EPA would be able - in concert with the states - to set and enforce standards for air
and water quality and for individual pollutants.

•

Industries seeking to minimize the adverse impact of their activities on the environment
would be assured of consistent standards covering the full range of their waste disposal
systems.

•

As states developed and expanded their own pollution control programs, they would be
able to look to one agency to support their efforts with financial and technical assistance
and training (para 4.)

TSCA Implementation
The need for oversight on the chemical manufacturing industry was becoming
increasingly clear. As the public outcry grew louder, there was “a realization that the chemical
industry was not effectively policing itself in the absence of effective regulation” (Eichenberger,
2015, p. 126). Eichenberger stated that witnesses came forward to Congressional committees and
testified “that certain chemical manufacturers and processors knew about the carcinogenic
effects of chemicals used in the processes, but intentionally withheld the information from the
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public, their employees and the government in an effort to avoid liability and regulation” (2015,
p. 126).
According to Eichenberger (2015), Congress intended to put the burden of any regulatory
compliance and chemical hazards directly on the chemical industry in the form of required
information. The industry would be forced to share the information they already knew and
address the gaps about what they did not know. While their intentions to address the public’s
safety was noble, the final product that emerged was influenced by the chemical industry.
Ultimately “Congress sought to balance concerns over toxic exposure and our information deficit
with assurance that our burgeoning chemical industry would maintain its ability to operate and
innovate” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 127).
“Although both the Senate and House of Representatives agreed that the proposal should
be enacted as law, the two houses could not come to a consensus on the exact language of the
provisions” (Behnke, 2017, p. 461). But the Congressional disagreements were soon to be
resolved. “In 1976, the urgency of passing the bill received an unanticipated and tragic increase
due to an outbreak of severe neurological disorders in workers at a company that manufactured
pesticides” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 127). Eichenberger continued to state that as the national
news picked up on the story, the increased coverage put additional pressure on Congress to
finally act.
Congressional action took the form of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). After
these events, chemical regulation in the United States was finally born. The need for the bill was
justified based on President Nixon’s committee recommendations and had the legal backing of
the clause in the United States Constitution that charges the government with the responsibility
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to ensure the general welfare of the country’s citizens (Krimsky, 2017). Behnke reported that
“President Ford signed TSCA into law on October 11, 1976” (2017, p. 461).
TSCA’s Content
When TSCA was enacted, the EPA was placed in charge of the enforcement of the laws
governing manufacturing and the chemicals used by the industry (Behnke, 2017). According to
Eichenberger (2015), the original structure of TSCA was limited to one section, also known as
Title I. Under Title I, the EPA was “authorized to gather information, regulate chemical
substances, and disseminate the information it collects to interested parties” (Eichenberger, 2015,
p. 127).
One example of gathering information was that the EPA compiled a list of all chemicals
in use at the time. When the list was compiled, it reached over 62,000 chemicals. These
chemicals were immediately considered grandfathered and safe to use commercially, unless they
were eventually proven as unsafe. (Krimsky, 2017).
Another method under which the EPA could gather information was through cooperation with a
chemical’s manufacturer, Eichenberger stated that the EPA could:
Require manufacturer testing of existing chemicals under certain circumstances, require
pre-market screening and regulatory tracking for new chemicals, control unreasonable
risks through regulation, gather information about production, use, and adverse effects of
existing chemicals, and protect certain business information it receives. (2015, pp. 127128)
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As maintained by Behnke (2017), even with the ability to require testing, TSCA
legislation came up short with respect to information sharing. Manufacturers did not have to
“disclose the hazardous traits of chemicals to the public, private, or government entities that used
these substances” (Behnke, 2017, p. 462). This shortcoming would eventually become one of the
major failings of TSCA.
When a chemical was found to be a danger to either to health or to the environment, then
the EPA was allowed to issue rules to regulate the chemical. Some of options for an issued rule
could range from a notice to distributors on the chemical hazards, all the way up to a total ban on
a chemical. However, there were certain considerations the EPA had to address before they could
regulate a chemical through these rules (Eichenberger, 2015).
As stated by Krimsky, for the EPA to regulate a chemical:
In addition, under the act, EPA had to demonstrate that the benefits of regulation a
chemical were greater than the costs – to the manufacturer, to companies utilizing the
chemical, and to the economy – and that its regulation offered greater benefit than the
social value of the products it was used to create. (2017, p. 3)
When a chemical was to be regulated, a new rule would be issued. This was a lengthy
process that could take at least three to five years. Due to the difficult nature, costs and time
involved with issuing a rule, the EPA found that negotiating voluntary agreements with chemical
manufacturers was far easier, cheaper and faster (Eichenberger, 2015).
As the EPA collected data from manufacturers and testing, there were certain rules in
place under TSCA that restricted with whom they could share those findings. Companies could
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claim to the EPA that the data they provided was confidential and not to be shared. When a
confidentiality claim was made, the information was protected. If the information was leaked or
disclosed, the offending party could have been fined and imprisoned (Eichenberger, 2015).
Banning Asbestos
According to Behnke (2017), the wording of the TSCA legislation allowed for many
loopholes and exclusions that chemical manufacturers could exploit and defeat the EPA’s
rulings. The “EPA could, in theory, take an existing chemical off the market but it would have to
meet a formidable burden, namely produce substantial evidence that the chemical presents or
will present an unreasonable risk to health and the environment” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 3). Behnke
goes on to state that TSCA “put the government in a position in which it lacked the legal tools it
needed to prevent or substantially limit possible environmental and health hazards” (2017, p.
461). One example of TSCA’s failure was the EPA’s attempt to ban asbestos, which had been
proven to be a known carcinogen (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).
“By 1970, asbestos was used in some 3,000 products, such as roof shingles, floor tiles,
house siding, ironing boards, and particularly in brakes, among other consumer items” (Rosner &
Markowitz, 2017, p. 1395). According to Rosner and Markowitz, asbestos was still able to be
used in brakes and construction materials even in current times. The material can still be found in
homes and businesses anywhere in the United States.
Rosner and Markowitz (2017) state that as far back as the 1930s, asbestos was suspected
of being dangerous to workers. When materials that contained asbestos were cut or ground down,
it was noted that the dust produced would slowly strangle the workers. Around 30 years later,
asbestos was suspected as being a cause of the lung cancer, mesothelioma. The British Ford
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Motor Company held “conference in 1969 on the possible dangers presented to brake mechanics
and those installing or replacing brake linings” (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017, p. 1395).
Committees were established by industry to look at the effects. Some examples of these
committees were the Asbestos Study Committee and the Asbestos Information Association of
North America. These committees were aware and accepted that asbestos was a danger to
workers who were handling items such as brakes. These industrial committees also understood
why the government was issuing new regulations to protect workers, even if they were not in
complete agreement (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).
One such regulation was that companies must warn their employees of the dangers
asbestos posed to them. After this regulation was issued, the brake industry decided they would
not warn their workers. The industry executives acted in defiance instead. “They publicly
pronounced that asbestos, when ‘locked in’ to fabrics, lacquers, plastics or other finished
products, was not a danger as it could not be released into the air” (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017,
p. 1396). The committee members did privately acknowledge that brakes functioned through
friction, and used brakes exposed workers. Warnings were again considered, but ultimately
disregarded because of the damage it would have brought to their products (Rosner &
Markowitz, 2017).
More and more studies were released over the next few years that linked asbestos to
cancer. In light of these, the government, OSHA in particular, attempted to regulate the amount
of asbestos fibers that could be free in the air. In 1975, the plan was to reduce the regulation from
5 fibers/cc to 2 fibers/cc. There was a push to reduce the regulation further to 0 fibers/cc, as that
would be the only truly safe level of exposure. The industry called the 2 fibers/cc limit
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impossible to meet by the deadline that was in place. Additionally, the industry definitely could
not ever meet a zero-level threshold. A year later, OSHA altered the recommendation to push the
limit to 0.5 fibers/cc. The industry opposed yet again, and the standard held at 2 fibers/cc till the
1980’s (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).
The industry was well aware of the effects of using asbestos and the toll it was having on
their employees. Eventually industry executives agreed to post warning signs in auto workshops
and garages, but would not use the wording the government suggested, which mentioned
asbestosis and cancer. Instead, they posted that asbestos might be hazardous to a person’s health
(Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).
Eventually the EPA took over the fight from OSHA and outright banned asbestos in the
United States. The ban was challenged in the judicial system and eventually came to a head in
the case of Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA that was heard in the 5th Circuit of the United States
Federal Court of Appeals. The court ruled against and overturned “the EPA regulation that
banned asbestos products on a number of grounds, including that the EPA had failed to give
adequate weight to statutory language requiring it to promulgate the least burdensome,
reasonable regulation required to protect the environment adequately” (Fisher, 2014, pp. 166167). Behnke (2017) stated that the main factor that went against the EPA in the case was the
‘least burdensome’ statement in TSCA. In this case, the court ruled that least burdensome meant
the EPA had to consider the cost on industry and evaluate if there was another way to regulate
asbestos rather than an outright ban. After this ruling went against the EPA, their perceived
power was significantly damaged. “The EPA did not attempt to regulate any other existing
chemicals under TSCA” (Behnke, 2017, p. 461).
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Premanufacturing Notification
The EPA was left near powerless to regulate existing chemicals after losing the asbestos
court battle. But regulating new chemicals which were being introduced into the market, and not
previously listed on TSCA’s chemical inventory, was covered by a whole different set of
undamaged rules (Krimsky, 2017). DeVito and Farris (1997) state that this review process began
in 1979. According to Eichenberger, “TSCA’s premanufacture notification requirement has been
reasonably successful at requiring companies to notify the EPA when a new chemical is
manufactured or an existing chemical is put to a new use” (2015, p. 134).
When a chemical company designed a new product and a customer became interested
after evaluating experimental samples, the chemical company was not allowed to make the
product on an industrial scale right away. The manufacturer was required to first notify the EPA
of their intentions to produce a new chemical. This notification was called a premanufacturing
notice (Krimsky, 2017).
Eichenberger (2015) stated that once the EPA was notified, they had 90 days to review
the premanufacturing data submitted by the manufacturer. Eichenberger also stated that the
notice “shall include health, safety and test data, the manufacturer is only required to provide
what is known to them or reasonably ascertainable” (2015, p. 135). “There were no penalties
associated with lack of data” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 4).
R. Auerbach stated that when filing a premanufacturing notification, quite a lot of
information could be part of the submission if the manufacturer wished (personal
communication, October 6, 2019). R. Auerbach offered some examples of EPA requested
information such as composition, structure, residual monomers, manufacturing process,

CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT

33

treatment of waste, employee and end user exposure, spectral data, and any available toxicity
data. But only some information was required by TSCA and the rest was voluntarily provided
by manufacturer, if they desired.
“In general, these notifications contain no testing data and only an estimated fifteen
percent contain any health and safety information” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135). Krimsky (2017)
reported that as of 2003, 85 percent of the premanufacturing notifications submitted to the EPA
did not contain data concerning human health. Eichenberger goes on to state that this created a
system that rewarded chemical companies to know very little about the products that they were
attempting to take to market. While the more responsible companies that generated the proper
amount of test data for the EPA would be at a regulatory disadvantage.
DeVito and Farris (1997) summarize the EPA’s approval process:
The PMN Review Process consists of four distinct, successive technical phases: the
chemistry review phase, the hazard (toxicity) evaluation phase, the exposure evaluation
phase and the risk assessment/risk management phase. These phases are structured to
“drop” substances of low-risk from review and to focus more sharply on, and explore
more deeply, those substances of greater risk as the review progresses.
Certain types of polymers could have been an example of a drop substance. The EPA
established that these polymers were not suspected of being dangerous to the environment or to
humans. Certain criteria was required to be met by these polymers in order to qualify to be
dropped from review. Some examples of these requirements were the type of polymer, measured
oligomer levels below certain thresholds (10% <500 Daltons and 25% <1,000 Daltons), and that
the polymer could not swell when exposed to water. These were just a few of the rules that
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applied for drop requirements, although the 90 day wait period was still enforced even if the
application was dropped from review (DeVito & Farris, 1997).
Eichenberger (2015) stated that the EPA could extend the 90-day window due to limited
data. DeVito and Farris (1997) state that the window for extension could only be a maximum of
180 days. However, Eichenberger stated that the criteria for extensions were typically hard to
justify. If the EPA wanted to delay a premanufacturing notice “which they feel lacks sufficient
health and safety information, the agency has the burden to show that the manufacture,
processing, or distribution of the chemical may present an unreasonable risk or will result in
substantial exposure” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135).
R. Auerbach related that of all the premanufacturing notices that he had been a part of,
only once had the EPA requested additional information that would have delayed the 90-day
window (personal communication, October 6, 2019). R. Auerbach stated that the test data the
EPA had requested was additional toxicity data, which would have cost his company
approximately $100,000 to pay for the testing. Ultimately, the premanufacturing notification was
withdrawn.
“On average the EPA receives between 600 and 2,000 premanufacture notifications per
calendar year” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135). With all the new chemicals that entered the market
through the premanufacturing notifications, it was expected that there would be “approximately
85,000 chemicals on the TSCA inventory by 2017” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 4). However, according
to Eichenberger, the EPA’s chemical inventory was viewed as flawed and not correct. Chemicals
that were no longer manufactured were supposed to be removed from the list. But chemical
manufacturers were not required by TSCA to report to the EPA if they had discontinued making
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products. And so, most do not bother with notifying the EPA. “Current industry estimates place
the actual number of chemicals in commerce at about 25,000” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 136).
The combination of such a short amount of time for review and the overwhelming
amount of new chemicals applications submitting to enter the market was not a recipe for
success. “Lack of agency resources and inability to move quickly makes it nearly impossible for
the EPA to conduct an adequate premarket review based on the notification” (Eichenberger,
2015, p. 135). In short, the EPA’s regulation of new chemicals under the limitations of TSCA
was set up for failure from the very beginning.
State Preemption
Under the original TSCA, states were authorized to develop their own legislation to
govern the use of chemicals inside their borders. These laws were required to go above and
beyond the federal regulations in place from Congress and the EPA. In this case, the federal laws
were essentially a minimum set of regulations. For example, no state could pass laws to have
laws that were less stringent than federal regulation to attract industry interest. However, if a
federal law was in conflict with the state’s law, the federal law would always preempt the state
through the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution (Behnke, 2017).
According to Behnke, “numerous states have spent a decade or more developing their
own regulatory systems on chemical substances. Over time, several states- including California,
Washington, Maine, Maryland, and Minnesota – have become leaders on executing increasingly
stringent laws” (2017, p. 473). The unquestioned regulatory leader amongst these states was
California with their 1986 legislation named Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act or
as the chemical industry knew it, Proposition 65 (Lovett, 1997).
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Proposition 65 “requires businesses to publish warnings when exposing consumers to
significant amounts of chemicals identified by the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity”
(Lovett, 1997, p. 368). Lovett reported that Proposition 65 placed the responsibility of regulatory
labeling onto the manufacturer. The Californian government was only responsible for assembling
the list of chemicals which were suspected to be cancer causing or posed reproductive hazards.
The effects of Proposition 65 have led to positive effects in California through the threat
of economic loss. As explained by Lovett (1997), sales have been severely affected by the
required warning of birth defects and cancer on product labels. “Even the threat of having to give
Proposition 65 warnings can prompt immediate reformulation of a product” (Lovett, 1997, p.
369).
Lovett listed some examples of these product formula changes:
•

Eliminating trichloroethylene from typewriters correction fluid;

•

The discovery that lead was leaching into wine from foil caps, spurring the now-universal
use of plastic or aluminum caps; and

•

A series of failure-to-warn cases in the mid-1990s that caused industry to redesign
plumbing fixtures and water pumps so that lead would not be leached into the water
through brass parts (1997, p. 369).

Lautenberg Reform
In Charleston, West Virginia on January 9, 2014, a bulk tank filled with 4methylcyclohexane methanol (MCHM) had leaked. The 10,000-gallon spill flowed into a nearby
river that was the main supply of drinking water for 300,000 people. The properties and health
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effects of MCHM were incomplete at best. The people of the area were still using bottled water
for drinking, bathing and cooking for months after the incident. Public outrage pushed for
renewed calls for chemical reform following the spill (Eichenberger, 2015).
According to Krimsky (2017), an example of TSCA’s failings was that under the original
TSCA, the EPA had to ensure that in eliminating chemicals they had chosen the least
burdensome process to achieve their goal. The wording of least burdensome had caused the
judicial system to rule against the EPA as was seen in the attempt to ban asbestos. As a result,
“since 1976, the EPA has used its authority under TSCA to limit or ban only 5 existing
chemicals: fully halogenated chlorofluororoalkanes, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dioxin,
asbestos (later overturned by the courts), and hexavalent chromium” (Krimsky, 2017, p.4).
The manufacturing industry and environmental groups both added themselves to the
growing list of those eager for TSCA reform. The chemical industry was looking to increase the
public’s confidence after years of decreasing trust, open avenues for increased innovative ideas,
and establish uniform nationwide regulations, rather than differing rules state to state.
Environmental groups were pushing for regulation that was more effective in the judicial system
and reduce the ever-increasing number of hazardous chemicals and their effect on environmental
and human health (Eichenberger, 2015).
As TSCA continued to flounder, Senator Frank Lautenberg, a Democrat from the state of
New Jersey, stepped up to become a champion for chemical safety reform. According to Plautz
and National Journal (2015), Lautenberg had earlier in his career led bills through the Senate to
stop airlines from allowing smoking on planes and to toughen punishment for drunk drivers. But
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his dream was to cap off his legacy by shepherding legislation on chemical safety reform through
Congress.
Guc (2018) stated that Lautenberg introduced the Kid Safe Chemicals Act of 2005 to
indicate the need for regulation reform. He never expected this bill to pass though. In 2010,
Lautenberg introduced the Safe Chemicals Act of 2010 and then updated, refined and
reintroduced the Safe Chemicals Act of 2011. Neither bill made any progress through the Senate
(Filipec, 2014).
In 2013, Lautenberg partnered with two very different Senators on chemical reform bills.
The Safe Chemical Act of 2013 was co-sponsored with Senator Kristen Gillibrand, and
ultimately met the same fate as the previous versions of the bill (Filipec, 2014). Per Plautz and
National Journal (2015), Lautenberg then invited Senator Joe Manchin to co-sponsor another
reform legislation attempt, but Manchin declined. Instead Manchin encouraged Lautenberg to
meet with Senator David Vitter. Vitter was a Republican from Louisiana and the two had never
really worked together before.
Vitter had been working on a competing reform bill that would have been more industry
friendly than Lautenberg’s. The two Senators sat down, got to know each other, and agreed they
could work together. They merged their bills, each removed certain aspects the other disliked.
And shortly after, a bipartisan bill was introduced to Congress by the unlikely pair. The
bipartisan effort initially scared off some of each Senator’s previous supporters due to
widespread distrust of the other party (Plautz & National Journal, 2015).
Then, “just six weeks after the bill came out, Lautenberg passed away at age 89” (Plautz
& National Journal, 2015, para. 13). Plautz and National Journal stated that despite the death of
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his across-the-aisle partner, Vitter continued to press their bill after receiving the encouragement
of Lautenberg’s widow. Vitter sought out a new Democratic partner in Tom Udall from New
Mexico. The two decided to make some changes including renaming the bill after their fallen
comrade, grandfathering several state laws, and adding more provisions protecting populations
most vulnerable to the effects of chemical toxicity, such as elderly, children, and pregnant
women.
According to Plautz and National Journal (2015), Vitter and Udall worked their way
through the Senate looking for co-sponsors. Plautz and National Journal stated that the goal was
to reach 60 senators to avoid the Senatorial tactic of blocking a bill known as a filibuster.
Another goal was to keep the co-sponsor count as a one-for-one deal, to truly be bipartisan.
When they signed on a Republican co-sponsor, they made sure to also find another Democrat
sponsor. The bill was ultimately passed and delivered to the Oval Office. “On June 22, 2016,
President Barack Obama signed the ‘Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century
Act’ into law” (Behnke, 2017, p. 464).
The New Lautenberg TSCA
The Lautenberg Act increased the authority of the EPA to enforce the regulatory laws
that had long been ignored. The EPA was now allowed to require information from
manufacturers. This data had previously been only rarely provided to the EPA on a voluntary
basis (Krimsky, 2017).
Guc (2018) described the EPA’s testing ability as such:
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EPA no longer must compel testing through rule promulgation. Instead, EPA may require
testing through an order or consent agreement, and even then, EPA can require testing
merely for the purposes of developing more information about the chemical in question,
or its manufacturing process or role in commerce. (p. 470)
According to Krimsky (2017), the EPA was now able to judge if an unreasonable risk to
health existed from a chemical. Krimsky continued to state that if a chemical did pose such a
risk, then the EPA would no longer subject to their biggest loophole. The least burdensome
method of regulation was mercifully eliminated, which as was seen in the asbestos case, usually
fell back to a cost – benefit analysis.
Although certain state chemical programs were grandfathered, such as California’s Prop
65, the federal government established a much more dominate role in the regulation of
chemicals. Behnke (2017) stated that “if the EPA has determined a chemical does not pose an
unreasonable risk, then the states cannot enact new legislation or continue to enforce previous
legislation” (p. 467). Krimsky (2017) reported that any regulations a state had in place on a
chemical would be preempted if the EPA was conducting a safety assessment.
“In an effort to triage what has become a forty-year backlog of chemicals that need
testing, the new TSCA mandated a prioritization scheme which had to be developed within a
year of the Act’s enactment” (Guc, 2018, p. 471). Guc continued to describe the prioritization of
chemicals, which was broken down in two categories; high-priority and low-priority. Ten of the
chemicals designated as high-priority for risk evaluations were required to be pulled from an
official document named TSCA Work Plan for Chemical Assessments.
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The high-priority list was required to be composed of 20 chemicals, plus an additional 20
placed on the low-priority list (Guc, 2018). Guc continued to state that after one of the 20 highpriority chemicals had completed its safety assessment, then a new chemical must be added to
the high-priority list. According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2019a),
with the known data that had existed on a chemical, certain criteria would have to be reviewed
each time before an addition could be made to the high-priority list:
•

The hazard and exposure potential of the chemical substance;

•

Persistence and bioaccumulation;

•

Potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulations;

•

Storage near significant sources of drinking water;

•

The conditions of use or significant changes in the conditions of use of the chemical
substance; and

•

The volume or significant changes in the volume of the chemical substance manufactured
or processed (para. 4).
Once a chemical has been labeled as high-priority, it would undergo a risk evaluation.

The risk evaluation examined how the chemicals were used, who was exposed, and any hazards
the material presented to humans and the environment. The EPA would have to assess the likely
exposure routes a chemical presented. The EPA would also be required to list all hazards that the
chemical may cause, such as cancer, neurological issues, or mutations. After these steps were
complete, a risk determination would identify if the chemical posed an unreasonable risk. If the
chemical was a hazard, then it would be subject to additional risk management steps (United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2019b).
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The first 10 chemicals selected in December 2016 by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency for risk evaluations were:
•

Asbestos

•

1-Bromopropane

•

Carbon Tetrachloride

•

1,4 Dioxane

•

Cyclic Aliphatic Bromide Cluster (HBCD)

•

Methylene Chloride

•

N-Methylpyrrolidone

•

Perchloroethylene

•

Pigment Violet 29

•

Trichloroethylene (2019b, para. 23).
When a company decided to manufacture a new chemical under the old TSCA, all the

company was required to do was wait 90 days after notifying the EPA. Under the Lautenberg
TSCA, an acknowledgment from the EPA was now required that stated that they believe the
chemical posed no unreasonable risk. The EPA also updated its new chemical notification
system, which was now handled through submission of registration data through a manufacturer
specific secure portal (R. Auerbach, personal communication, September 11, 2019).
New and existing chemicals that would require testing were now subject to fees to be
paid by the applying manufacturer. The fees that were collected were now deposited into a
TSCA specific fund that supported regulatory compliance efforts. This fund had not existed
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under the original TSCA. Previously, any fees that were collected had gone directly into the
United States Treasury general fund (Guc, 2018).
Polymer Exemption
One exception to new chemical registration was to be qualified for polymer exemption.
In accordance with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2017), polymer
exemptions were “to encourage the manufacture of safer polymers by reducing industry’s
reporting burden for this category of chemical substances and concentrate the Agency’s review
resources on substances expected to pose higher risk” (para. 1). The United States Environmental
Protection Agency stated that any polymer that met the exemption rules was allowed to be
manufactured without filing of a premanufacturing notification.
The manufacturer of a polymer-exempt material would be required to retain records that
were subject to inspection by the EPA. Reports were also required to be submitted annually by
January 31st on the pounds produced and number of polymer exempt materials that were
manufactured or distributed. This method was expected to free up EPA resources to be able to
focus on higher risk chemicals (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).
Criteria for exemptions include:
•

Polymers with molecular weight (MW) of 1,000 Daltons or greater and less than 10,000
Daltons are eligible, with restrictions on low MW species and reactive functional groups;

•

Polymers with MW of 10,000 Daltons or greater, with restrictions on low MW species
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017, para. 5).

CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT

44

The list of allowable elements has been expanded to include chlorine, bromine, iodine as
monatomic counterions; and fluorine, chlorine, bromine and iodine if covalently bound to
carbon; biopolymer which meet the polymer definition are no longer excluded; polymers that
are cationic or anticipated to become cationic in aquatic environments are now eligible for
exemption if the polymer is solid, not soluble or dispersible in water and will be used only in
solid phase, or equivalent weight is equal or greater than 5,000; and there is an expanded list
of specified reactants for polyesters. (United States Environmental Agency, 2017, para. 6)
There were exclusions that prevented some polymers from being listed as polymer exempt.
Polymers that break down or decompose were not eligible. All raw materials that were included
in the synthesis of a polymer must be included on TSCA’s chemical inventory list. If a polymer
absorbed water, then it was also prevented from being listed as polymer exempt (United States
Environmental Agency, 2017).
Non-Compliance with TSCA
Under the new TSCA, the punishments for non-compliance could be severe. For
example, if a company was discovered to be selling a non-TSCA listed or a non-polymer
exempted product in the United States, the monetary fines would be severe. The offending
company’s regulatory specialist and ownership would be held as the responsible parties and
could be subject to possible imprisonment (R. Auerbach, personal communication, September
11, 2019).
State of Lautenberg’s TSCA
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The new legislation has had a great effect by expanding the EPA’s authority and restored
their presence in the chemical regulatory world. But criticism still existed from environmental
and the industry. On one hand, some think the legislation was not enough and tramples state’s
rights to self regulate and enforce stricter laws. As previously stated, a state cannot legally pass a
law that goes beyond the federal law, barring a judicial challenge (Behnke, 2017). But, on the
other side of the argument, the Lautenberg reform had gone too far. Some feel that the EPA had
been given too much authority and was using it to overregulate. That side has been fighting
overregulation by attempting to reduce the EPA’s financial resources.
Effects of Changing Administrations on TSCA
The push to regulate and limit industrial damage to the environment was first put into law
on January 1, 1970. The first of many laws to come was the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which was approved by President Nixon (Pelley, 2008). “The idea behind the NEPA,
also known as the Magna Carta of U.S. environmental policy, is simple: federal agencies should
evaluate and disclose the environmental impacts of major projects before they are launched”
(Pelley, 2008, p. 7).
Since Nixon’s administration there have been eight administrations to hold the office of
President of the United States. Those administrations have had vastly different beliefs, be it
personal or through outside influence, on how the Environmental Protection Agency should be
ran. “Wealthy donors, think tanks, and fossil fuel and chemical industries have become more
influential in fighting regulation. In the broader public, political polarization has increased, the
environment has become a partisan issue, and science and the mainstream media are distrusted”
(Fredrickson et al., 2018, p. 96).
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During the Nixon administration, the Environmental Protection Agency was created and
the Clear Air (1970) and Clean Water Acts (1972) were signed into law (Fredrickson et al,
2018). And in 1976, with President Ford’s signature, the Toxic Substances Control Act became
law (Guc, 2018). It wasn’t until the 1980’s that the environmental policies of the previous
decade were first threatened.
“Reagan abandoned the practice of previous administrations of appointing agency heads
with federal government experience and sympathy for the agency’s mission. Instead he chose
people from industry who shared his anti-regulatory views” (Fredrickson et al, 2018, p. 96).
According to Fredrickson et al., Anne Gorsuch was named Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Gorsuch had been a harsh critic and vocal opponent against the Clean Air
Act and other environmentally friendly regulations. Gorsuch slashed the EPA’s staff by 21
percent and cut civil cases against industry by 75 percent in her first two years on the job. Under
Gorsuch’s watch the agency “resisted classifying formaldehyde as a human carcinogen,”
“neglected to warn about dioxin levels in the Great Lakes fish” and was slow “on a clean-up of
heavily leaded soil around a Dallas, Texas smelter” (Fredrickson et al, 2018, p. 97).
Gorsuch was eventually forced out of office mainly due to leaks from within the EPA
that highlighted the neglect her department had fostered. Reagan, under public pressure reappointed William Ruckelshaus, the Agency’s first administration to the post. For the remainder
of Reagan’s Administration, Ruckelshaus ran the department with transparency and
independently from politics (Fredrickson et al., 2018).
The next time the Environmental Protection Agency was threatened came during the
administration of President George W. Bush. The threats were not as overt, but relied “on
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delaying decisions and undermining science, rather than cutting budgets” (Frederickson et al.,
2018, p. 98). According to Pelley, under the Bush 43 administration, the NEPA was sidestepped
as needed. A portion of border fence that was to be constructed would run through “the San
Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area in Arizona, plugging up season streams and wildlife
corridors” (Pelley, 2008, p. 7). Because the environmental impact studies were skipped, these
side effect of blocked streams and wildlife migration were not anticipated.
Pelley (2008) related that other laws that were passed during the Bush 43 years that
attempted to ignore the environmental impact studies. These studies were required through the
NEPA and could take up to three and a half years to complete, or essentially a Presidential term.
The Bush 43 administration was after seeking results.
The harshest Presidential administration that has affected the Environmental Protection
Agency’s mission thus far has been Donald Trump’s. A traditional Republican administration
would typically attempt to encourage a healthy economy through less government intervention in
private commerce. However, Trump’s administration has hardly been a traditional
administration. The current mission has seemed to be to undo the previous administration’s
environmental efforts en masse, with or without cause or consideration for the long-term damage
caused to the planet, wildlife, or even the human race. “Trump has made eliminating federal
regulations a priority” (Popovich, Albeck-Ripka & Pierre-Louis, 2019, para. 1). According to
Popovich et al., the Trump administration has targeted over 80 regulations to scale back or
eliminate all together.
Fredrickson et al. (2018) stated that Scott Pruitt, who made his reputation on being a
hostile opponent of the Environmental Protection Agency, was appointed to be Trump’s first
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Administrator. In 2018, the proposed budget for the Agency was to be cut by 31 percent, a higher
percentage than Reagan ever achieved. The Administration has “removed or obscured
information about climate change from web sites, dismissed scientific advisory panels” and
blocked scientific grants given out by the Agency (Fredrickson et al., 2018, p. 100).
After several controversies, Pruitt moved on, but the mission remained to be the same. A
former coal lobbyist, Andrew Wheeler was next to take over as Acting Administrator (Trump
administration…, 2019). Under Wheeler, one standard the Agency was attempting to roll back
was the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) which came into effect in 2012 and
primarily affected coal plants. The MATS legislation “required plants to reduce mercury and
other pollutants by over 90% in five years and since the rule was created, mercury emissions
have dropped by 80-90%” (Trump administration…, 2019, p. 16). Inside the utilities industry,
not everyone was on board with rolling back the standard.
The majority of utilities companies have already made the changes required by MATS by
investing in equipment such as scrubbers. An open letter by trade groups and unions to
the EPA in July 2018 stated that any change in the rules would be of no benefit because
they have already spent an estimated US $18bn to comply since 2012. (Trump
administration…, 2019, p. 17)
The utilities companies were not the only ones opposed to deregulation. “More than 20
states are suing the Trump administration over its rollback of climate-change regulations for
power plants in what could be a landmark case deciding what the federal government’s
responsibility is for fighting global warming” (Puko, 2019, para. 1). Puko stated that the states
were accusing the federal government of abandoning the Clean Air Act. The Trump
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administration had stopped enforcing the Obama era Clean Power Plan and replaced it with less
strict Affordable Clean Energy rules.
The Environmental Protection Agency has had its share of ups and downs over the years
since its inception. The Agency was given a near unenforceable mandate by the original TSCA,
and then receiving broad new powers under the revised bill. But these new powers will always
be at the mercy of the administration in the White House at the time. Nixon, Ford, Carter, Bush
41, Clinton, Obama seem to have given the Agency varying degrees of support, while Reagan,
Bush 43, and Trump have attempted to pull the rug out from underneath it.
United States vs. Europe
According to Negev et al, “chemical regulations in individual countries are known to
influence regulatory practices in other countries through trade” (2018, p. 463). Negev et al also
stated that the two largest and most influential markets in the world were the United States and
the European Union. The two regulatory systems act as informational role models to other
countries that have attempted to avoid international trade barriers with the two large trading
blocs (2018).
Response of the United States
That does not necessarily mean that the United States and European Union were in lock
step with each other in their regulatory beliefs. The United States attempted to influence the
world market by attempting to limit the growing influence of European Union since before
REACH’s implementation. In reality, there was quite an underground resistance to the REACH
legislation from the United States industry and the government.
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According to Brown (2003):
Industry groups such as the European Chemical Industry Council and the American
Chemistry Council, as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have mounted major
lobbying campaigns to ease REACH’s impact on business, asserting that REACH would
cause widespread unemployment, deal a body blow to the U.S. economy and
“deindustrialize” Europe by forcing manufacturers into the developing world. (p. 769)
In the United States at the time of REACH’s implementation, when the chemical industry
claimed information that was submitted to the EPA was a confidential trade secret, generally the
EPA accepted as fact. If the submitted data revealed hazardous information, then the claim could
have been challenged. If that information was found to not be confidential, then the EPA would
be able to share the hazardous chemical data it had obtained (Sissell, 2007). “TSCA and REACH
both protect confidential business information, but REACH requires greater public disclosure”
(Sissell, 2007, p. 21). The amount of information that REACH would be able to share with the
public was one of the unknowns that terrified the United States chemical industry.
Even within the United States’ own borders, the concept of REACH was having an effect
on certain states with a desire to have strong regulatory laws, much to the industry’s dismay
(Black, 2008). Black offered the example that Maine was searching for a better way to regulate
chemicals. An effort by the Governor of Maine in 2006 was heavily influenced by REACH’s
effort to develop safer chemical alternatives. The Governor issued an executive order to create a
“task force to come up with an overall policy requiring and offering incentives to develop safe
chemicals in consumer products” (Black, 2008, p. 127).

CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT

51

While the ideas of the proposed REACH were spreading, as reported by Black (2008),
the United States government appeared to be willing to help small to medium-sized companies
with the rigors of REACH registration, at least in the public eye. Black stated that the U.S.
Department of Commerce stated that their goal was to help prepare the small to medium sized
companies with training on what data would be required of them, and when they would be
required to submit it. However, the government’s effort may not have been completely
wholehearted. According to R. Auerbach, who was responsible for REACH registration of his
small to medium sized United States chemical company, “to my knowledge, the US Government
did not do anything to help companies with REACH registration” (personal communication,
September 11, 2019).
The United States government was also actively attempting to interfere and undermine
the REACH legislation before it was passed into law. Brown (2003) stated that a memo titled the
United States Nonpaper on EU Chemicals Policy was circulated to United States embassies in
the European Union in March 2002. Brown continued to state that Secretary of State Colin
Powell was responsible for this distribution and encouraged the United States ambassadors to
distribute the memo to trade and environmental groups in their assigned European countries. The
memo “was unsigned and printed on plain paper without any U.S. government letterhead. It said
REACH could distort global markets and violate World Trade Organization principles” (Brown,
2003, p. 769). According to Brown, the language used in the memo matched other reports being
prepared by United States industrial groups that were falsely claiming that the United States
products would be banned by political pressure in Europe.
Black (2008) described yet another United States effort to stave off REACH inspired influence in
the western hemisphere:
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In August 2007, in what could be thought of as the North American response to REACH,
the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed an agreement in Montebello, Quebec, to
assess 9,000 chemicals produced or imported in volumes of 25,000 pounds or more. The
countries are required to complete risk characterization on these chemicals by 2012. By
2020 the countries must have inventoried all chemicals currently in commerce. The
agreement is aimed at sharing information and coordinating risk management of the
chemicals. (p. 127)
Response of the European Union
The European Union was not entirely innocent with their attempts at world influence
either, although their efforts appear to have better intentions. In the opinion of Heyvaert, Europe
wanted to push their regulations as “an attempt to reel other regions into the European sphere of
influence” (2009, p. 116). Lewis et al. (2006) state that REACH’s influence “will eventually
have a much broader impact on chemicals policy and regulation initiatives as they begin to be
implemented on a worldwide scale” (p. 592). The European Union was looking to export their
chemical policy in an effort to build common ground and rapport “by opening scope for
cooperation and exchange, in which process the EU, as the original architect of the regulatory
format, is poised to take a central role” (Heyvaert, 2009, p. 117).
With REACH’s implementation, Europe was using their newly-enhanced influence to
supplant the United States as the world’s leader on chemical regulation. But their aspirations
may have been much higher than just that. The European Union’s push for additional global
influence coincided with a wide range of issues that Europe was making efforts to push toward
their ideal solutions. Issues such as the “the meteoric rise of India and China on the global
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market, the ascendance of complex and transboundary risks such as climate change on the global
political agenda, to the waning intellectual and moral leadership of the United States” (Heyvaert,
2009, p. 116).
Worldwide Influence
Some smaller countries, Israel for example, implemented their chemical regulatory rules
based off of both the United States’ TSCA and Europe’s REACH (Negev et al., 2018). For
example, “in 2016, Israel adopted the latest revision of the EU standard, which now regulates 18
trace metals” (Negev et al, 2018, p. 465). According to Negev et al., their old standard had been
limited to just eight trace metals, which matched the United States and the old European Union’s
standard. With the potential effect on human health and restricted trade with the European
Union, Israel chose to enact the tighter restriction.
Heyvaert (2009) maintained that if regulatory conditions were to become more alike
worldwide, then the required registration information will become much easier to prepare for
submission. Small markets have always looked to the larger markets for guidance in regard to
regulatory legislation. “Large regulated markets have both the expertise and resources to conduct
comprehensive risk assessments, upon which a small market can rely. From a trade perspective,
adopting standards of large markets reduces international trade barriers, both import and export”
(Negev et al., 2018, p. 468).
Conclusion
This examination has touched on just two of the dozens of different regulatory systems
across the world. The European Union’s REACH has been widely considered the toughest set of
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regulations throughout the world, while the United States’ TSCA was one of the first major sets
of regulations to attempt to govern industrial chemical manufacturing. However, it has taken
major bipartisan reform to allow the EPA to have had a chance to become effective.
A large portion of the chemical industry rallied against REACH from the start. The
industry felt “the financial burden created by the new and extended data reporting, the testing
and assessment provisions, and the authorization requirement would blight the chemical
industry’s competitiveness on the world market” (Heyvaert, 2009, p. 114). Perhaps the chemical
industry was scoffing at the notion that the burden of proof of chemical safety was shifted away
from government and onto the manufacturers themselves. Or, it could have been that so many
companies had to pay what could be construed as a tax, just for the privilege of potentially
selling their products into the European Union. Or, it might have been the effect of increased
scrutiny on the chemical market and the manufacturers occasional careless handling of their
chemicals had caused harm to human and environmental health. It may have been all these
reasons, a combination of them, or even another unnamed reason altogether that the chemical
industry was anti-REACH.
On the other hand, the United States had an unenforceable and ineffective program under
the original TSCA which was in place for over 40 years. Reform legislation with support from
the chemical industry, who had hoped for a more streamlined nationalized set of rules, was
passed in order to increase the strength of the EPA’s ability to enforce TSCA. The EPA was now
able to regulate new, and more importantly, existing chemicals equally, without the phrase of
‘least burdensome’ being held against them in judicial rulings. The EPA had a clear path to save
lives and make better efforts to protect the environment from industrial contamination. Until,
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only a few years later, the EPA’s funding was once again slashed by the whims of a new
Presidential administration.
REACH came into being despite efforts of the chemical industry and the leadership in
place at the time of the United States to thwart it. TSCA reform sprung out of a combination of
public outrage, a form of peer pressure that was felt coming from Europe, and an elder
politician’s crusade for reform. Both regulatory systems have merit and were created with the
best of intentions to protect human health and attempt to better protect the world in which the
human race exists.
Effective chemical regulation has been seemingly gaining momentum throughout the
world. More countries have begun to adopt REACH or TSCA regulations as their own in an
effort to reduce trade barriers and make chemical registration easier on importers and
manufacturers. Streamlining the required data may be the best way to appease the chemical
industry as a whole.
Will one set of these two regulations take precedence and become the worldwide
standard? Heyvaert stated that “the globalization of regulation may limit opportunities for
comparative learning and exchange, which narrows the basis for review and reform” (2009, p.
121). Or in other words, the chemical regulatory world could settle on one method and accept
that the findings discovered from a round of REACH or TSCA testing and apply the same data
worldwide. While these findings may be true, there still will be other chemical unknowns that
should be discovered. The scientific method teaches that results should be questioned, tests
should be re-ran and verified, and very rarely does an answer stay the same forever. Vigilance
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should continue to be practiced with an eye on future reform and refined test methods within the
world of chemical regulations for the sake of the environment and our future generations.
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